Search theory,competitive equilibrium,and the Nash bargaining solution

We investigate a canonical search-theoretic model without entry. Two agents are randomly matched with a long side being rationed. The matched agents face a pair of randomly drawn non-transferable payoffs, and then choose whether or not to form a partnership subject to a small probability of exogenous break down. As this probability and friction vanish, the Nash bargaining solution emerges as the unique undominated strategy equilibrium outcome if the mass of each party is the same. If the size of one party is larger than the other, the short side extracts the entire surplus, a sharp contrast to Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) [16].     

Effects of wholesaler concentration on retailers by format: evidence from Japanese brand-level price data

Using unique brand-level wholesale price data, this article examines how purchase prices of commodities for retailers are influenced by wholesale concentration. Compared with studies focusing on retail prices, little empirical work has measured the impact of wholesale concentration on wholesale prices. Economic theory suggests that the sensitivity of purchase price in response to degree of wholesale concentration is smaller for large retail formats than for small retail formats in the presence of intra-format retail competition. To test the validity of the theoretical implication, I measure the impact of the concentration on purchasing prices for retailers by format. Empirical findings support the hypothesis that the large retail format tends to draw advantageous purchase prices when wholesalers become increasingly oligopolistic.     

Strategic Transfer Pricing and Social Welfare under Product Differentiation

In this paper, we investigate the social impacts of strategic transfer pricing by oligopoly firms, aiming to derive regulatory implications for transfer prices. A notable finding from our model is that the negative effects on social welfare of transfer prices being set above marginal cost are pronounced when either (1) the number of competing firms is large and the product is relatively highly differentiated or (2) the number of firms is small and the product is not very differentiated. This result indicates that even when the number of firms in the industry is significant and the market is thus apparently competitive, the authorities should not overlook the possibility that setting transfer prices above marginal cost might seriously damage social welfare if the product is highly differentiated.     

Disability and Economy: A Game Theoretic Approach

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability‐related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, USA from the seventeenth century to the early years of twentieth, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness so that it was not treated as a disability. The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non‐deaf. In the first stage, the non‐deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into deaf people, bilinguals and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form a trio to play a three‐person bargaining game with infinite horizon, random proposers and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.     

Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties

We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy-motivated parties. The parties know which policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The announced positions of the parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties' private information. In all separating equilibria, when the left-wing party attains power, the policies it implements are to the right of the policies implemented by the right-wing party when it attains power. Intuitively, when right-wing policies become more attractive, the left party moves toward the right in order to be assured of winning, while the right-wing party stays put in a radical stance.     

Rationalizable foresight dynamics

This paper proposes and studies the rationalizable foresight dynamics. A normal form game is repeatedly played in a random matching fashion by a continuum of agents who make decisions at stochastic points in time. A rationalizable foresight path is a feasible path of action distribution along which each agent takes an action that maximizes his expected discounted payoff against another path which is in turn a rationalizable foresight path. We consider a set-valued stability concept under this dynamics and compare it with the corresponding concept under the perfect foresight dynamics.     

COMMENTS ON "MONEY IS PRIVACY" BY CHARLES KAHN, JAMES McANDREWS, AND WILLIAM ROBERDS: MONETARY THEORY AND GAME THEORY*

Three classes of models on money closely related to game theoretic models are (i) search theoretic models; (ii) repeated games (in a narrow sense); and (iii) trading post games. This note tries to point out the sense of affinity between the theory of microfoundations of money and the theory of "repeated games" in a broad sense of the term.     

Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric?

Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game.     

Accounting year-end dispersion and seasonality in the Japanese corporate bond market

Using monthly yield data on straight bonds, this article investigates seasonality in the Japanese corporate bond market. A statistical examination of spreads between the yield of each bond and a bond market index reveals that the yield spread consistently decreases from April to August, whereas it increases from September to December. Because accounting year-ends for most investors in Japan are concentrated in either March or December, this seasonality supports the hypotheses of tax-loss selling and window dressing. Moreover, the seasonality becomes more pronounced as the debt rating declines, consistent with the findings in previous studies investigating the US bond market.